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The Decalogue edited by Silvia Angrisani 
‘Against what you did’: 
Interpersonal Distances and Morality in Decalogue 5 
 
by Steve Jones 
 
‘…the encounter with the Other is my responsibility for him… 
the taking upon oneself the fate of the other’  
(Levinas, 2006: 88) 
 
 
Decalogue 5 is centered upon two pivotal acts of violence - a murder and an 
execution - the ambivalent natures of which form the basis of my reading here. While 
capital punishment appears to dominate as a central political motif, the topic also 
raises more universal issues regarding the moral self. In many respects the film is of a 
specific place and time; Kieslowski himself affirms that he ‘wanted to describe the 
Polish world’ (Kieslowski, 1993: 160), especially in terms of its economic hardships; 
‘[c]haos and disorder ruled Poland in the mid-1980s - everywhere, everything, 
practically everybody’s life’ (Kieslowski, 1993: 143). However, even this agenda 
quickly becomes more unifying in scope, as Kieslowski qualifies that politics ‘define 
where we are and what we’re allowed or aren’t allowed to do, but they don’t solve the 
really important human questions…politics were never the subject’ of the Decalogue 
films (Kieslowski, 1993: 144). The Poland of Decalogue 5 is rooted in the economic 
climate of the 1980’s, but the depiction of a place ‘where people don’t have any pity 
for each other…a world of people living alone’ is far broader than a solely political 
analysis might suggest (Kieslowski, 1993: 160). So it may seem that the film had a 
‘direct political impact in the suspension of Poland’s death penalty’ (Maurer, 2000: 
68), yet Kieslowski intimates that his central theme is ‘loneliness’, asserting that that 
the film is about ‘killing in general’.1 Therefore, in the reading that follows, the modes 
of characterisation and moral positions raised will be conceived as indicative of 
general concern with the human condition.2 
I will begin by exploring the emphasis the film places upon inter-personal 
distances. The film’s tone is epitomised by its detached mode of illustrating violent 
incursions, and this represents both the social fragmentation of the characters in their 
setting (which leads to murder), and the assumed objectivity of the Law (which seeks 
retribution for homicide). The stresses placed on observation directly implicate the 
audience’s own voyeuristic intent into its moral schema, collapsing the formal spaces 
between characters and audience. Witnessing and judgement - which are central 
narrative issues - are problematised by the ambiguity of the character’s actions. Even 
though I discuss the line between legitimised and illegitimate violence, I am not 
concerned with the death penalty debate so much as what that comparison suggests 
about moral consequence more generally. The supposedly abstract nature of the Law 
                                                 
1
 Moreover, he even appears to suggest that the linking of the film to the political debate 
surrounding capital punishment was coincidental (Kieslowski, 1993: 166). 
2
 My argument remains secular for reasons of space. For a religious discussion of capital 
punishment, see Temple, 1945. 
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which proclaims “right” and “wrong” is depicted according to formal and narratological 
devices which relate to that perceptual and ethical evaluation system. The 
development undertaken by the audience corresponds with that of Piotr, who begins 
the film as an embodiment of legal principle, and concludes in personal protest 
against its methodologies. His journey then, especially given his problematic affiliation 
with the Law, encapsulates Levinas’ proposal that we are reciprocally responsible for 
each other, and underscores problems arising from Kant’s assertion that the populous 
is brought into ‘union…through common laws…Each person is supposed to be both a 
maker and obeyer of certain common laws of conduct’ (Sorell, 1987: 69). Ultimately, 
in focusing communal ills upon the single subject, the execution thematically denotes 
that individuals are more generally fractured from the culture to which they “belong”. 
 
 
Observation/Alienation - Witnessing: 
 
We will begin with a dissection of the problems of observation - how the form and 
narrative are structured to both involve and disengage the audience - in order to 
probe the nature of judgement. Jacek’s alienation is most clearly designated by his 
behaviours, which indicate ‘proneness to boredom…lack of realistic long-term plans, 
and impulsivity’ - all of which also typify psychopathology (Jones, 2000: 42). 
Appositely, the Othering process (condemnation of and dissociation from the 
murderer) is not as easy as the viewer may hope, as Waldemar (the taxi driver and 
erstwhile victim of homicide) is shown in parallel to Jacek, aimlessly wasting his day 
with asocial behaviours. Early on, Jacek witnesses a violent scuffle (doing nothing to 
intervene), in juxtaposition to Waldemar ogling the grocer girl from afar - meaning 
the kind of voyeurism we undertake as viewers is coded as ugly and morally 
questionable from the outset. Jacek’s mischievous coffee flicking in the cafe is 
juxtaposed with Waldemar needlessly scaring passing dogs with his car horn. While 
neither incident is malicious in intent, it is Jacek’s that is the more gregarious 
(accompanied by shared smiles), even if it is a display of socially unacceptable 
behaviour. In both cases, the perpetrator is framed within (a building and car, 
respectively), and therefore they are distanced from the object of their unruliness by a 
pane of glass. Social fragmentation is rendered a collective experience here, as we too 
are positioned within (the café and the car), and are thus aligned with the perspective 
of either perpetrator (even if we are separated from them by the screen).  
Such “everyday” misanthropy is crucial in order to ascertain how we are to engage 
with the violence that follows, especially as it centres upon Jacek‘s willingness to step 
beyond the “anonymity” protection of the glass to interact with Waldemar, just as 
Piotr transgresses the clinical reticence of the Law through which he is meant to 
maintain empirical objectivity from Jacek’s behaviour. The form itself further 
implicates the viewer as part of the hostile paradigm, as it is shaped by the 
character’s isolation. The cinematography is polluted by filters as an expression of the 
protagonist’s mutual world-view; ‘if you put a green filter on the camera, the world 
becomes much crueller, duller and emptier’ (Kieslowski, 1993: 161). Character-
sentience influences form in this sense, highlighting that perception is not empirical - 
it is tainted by emotional mediation. Consequently, the audience is involved in 
Kieslowski’s vision of the modern condition, in which ‘we haven’t got any time left for 
feelings…for passion’, even to the extent that murder becomes unmotivated and 
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detached (Kieslowski, 1993: 145-6). Once again, the conceptual spaces between 
viewer and screen fluctuate between disruption and re-enactment. 
Even during the central instances of death, observation is again foregrounded; 
Jacek stares Waldemar in the eyes before deciding to cover his head, just as Jacek’s 
eyes are covered before the execution. Crucially, perception is inextricable from 
judgement; the presence of the witnessing Other actualises condemnation, if only as a 
projection-extension of the perpetrator’s guilt - as Pizzorno reveals, ‘when a person 
chooses, he has in mind the judgement that another person will give of the outcome 
of this choice’ (Turner and Rijord, 2006: 387).3 This is exacerbated by the 
omnipresence of Kieslowski’s every-witness; ‘[t]here’s this guy who wanders around 
in all the [Decalogue] films…He watches us, our lives. He’s not very pleased with 
us…he is a sort of sign or warning to those whom he watches, if they notice him’ 
(Kieslowski, 1993: 158-9). He functions as an omnipresent caution against violence, 
further implicating the ever-pervasive audience of the film as external judges.  
In alignment with our call to witness violence, the film appears to maintain a glib 
disconnection from the events. This impression derives from the coldness with which 
the characters interact (even in the murder sequence), as social fragmentation is 
made lucid. Jacek remains detached from the murder just as the guards uphold their 
impersonal professionalism during the execution. Yet, we begin to compensate for this 
lack of overt emotion (Mayerfield, 1999: 13), meaning that the horror of either death 
is essentially our own. Moreover, our engagement is paralleled by Piotr, who too 
protests the execution, even if he is not present for the murder. I will attend to the 
audience’s relation to Piotr’s journey presently - suffice it to say that Kieslowski allows 
the audience closure on events through Piotr’s own denouement, whereby he (and 
we) realise that one cannot maintain two contradictory positions - horrified and 
objectively distanced - simultaneously. Piotr is crucial for the audience, as he is the 
cipher through which we can eventually come to terms with violence emotively, 
because he acts as what Cerulo terms as our ‘point of entry’ into the text. Piotr frames 
the narrative, and so ultimately the tale is defined by his presence. He is also 
‘doublecast’ - that is placed in a morally ambiguous position - thereby ‘encourag[ing] 
the audience to consider multiple dimensions of the violence in question’ (Cerulo, 
1998: 50). In what follows than, I will investigate what we are to make of violence in 
this social context.   
 
 
Violence and Social Responsibility: 
 
The two instances of violence we encounter are separated by their social coding or 
moral sanctioning. As Goodman asserts, 
 
Two kinds of violence are…distinguished using dichotomies such as public-
private, legal-illegal, legitimate-illegitimate, useful-harmful etc. These are only 
distinguishable by the partisan justification given to one. In fact, one is termed 
positively - for example punishment or the enforcement of Law and order - 
while the other is censured as violence (Sumner, 1996: 160). 
                                                 
3
 See also Bull, 1973: 35-68. 
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As the moral uncertainty of characterization may insinuate, these types of violence 
are more alike than the discourses that code “legitimacy” would suggest. As Walter 
Benjamin contends ‘everything in the Law is always already violence, from its origins 
to its modes of conflict resolution, since in order to impose its own rule the Law is 
forced to resort to violence, punishment’ (Sumner, 1996: 179). Thus the 
commandment “Thou Shalt not Kill” is clearly levelled at all humans in the narrative, 
no matter what institution they belong to. 
At this point we may wish to question what the function of the death sentence is, 
or what claims the authorities make to justify taking the life of another. Jones avers 
that,  
 
the two main approaches [in a determination of the purposes of punishment] 
have been described as  “consequentialist”, where the punishment is targeted 
at affecting the offender’s (or other’s) future conduct, and “retributive”, where 
the punishment is commensurate with the amount of harm the offender has 
caused (Jones, 2000: 137).  
 
Vollmann’s multifaceted dissection of punishment (Vollmann, 2005: 383) also 
permits us to more pertinently dissect what the ramifications of punitive measures 
are, and place them in the context of the narrative. In this case, punishment cannot 
‘improve’ the offender, nor can it ‘isolate’ him in any other sense than it can remove 
his body from society. Arguably, Jacek was already socially self-isolated - this 
seemingly being intertwined with the cause of the crime - it can only prevent him 
from causing further harm. The chastisement also cannot ‘restore a balance of honour’ 
or ‘compensate, gratify or sooth the victim’. Here, the victim dies, and we are denied 
any view of his grieving loved ones, hence we cannot allocate such repercussions to 
the violence from his perspective - just as we do not see the car crash that results 
from Jacek rolling the rock off the bridge, even if we hear the consequences. In this 
instance, the best the Law can hope for is to ‘make him [here, Jacek] accept, or at 
least charge him with, responsibility of his crime’ and ‘assert a social norm’ (Vollmann, 
2005: 383).       
Execution may seem an extreme sentence as nothing can be gained at the level of 
the individual, but it plays out the macro-societal moral compass as if its ordinances 
are incontestable by ensuring the verdict is final. The line between killer and 
executioner is only contextual - a binary that sanctions one set of actions and vilifies 
another. However, Kieslowski equally seeks to disrupt this opposition. The execution is 
shared among a number of individuals organized into a collective (as made apparent 
by their uniforms), and this symbolically implicates the whole state in whose name the 
execution is imposed. Even if we are not active in enforcing justice (as those marked 
by uniforms are), we tacitly comply with its implementations; ‘the average citizen 
washes his hands of all responsibility and leaves it (silently) to the official avengers’ 
(Menninger, 1968: 144). Furthermore, Jacek’s execution occurs indoors, the enclosed 
space accentuating the finitude of the act and its knowability. In contrast, the isolating 
space surrounding Jacek and Waldemar in the initial murder sequence is explicitly 
without witnesses, stressing their alienation. The absence of delineated margins in 
this scene is apposite to convey our lack of awareness regarding Jacek’s homicidal 
motivations.  In this respect, we are connected with both murders - as one with the 
group of guards who execute Jacek, and in our absence from the murder of 
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Waldemar, which connotes our responsibility to fellow humans to quell such violence 
before it occurs. The aforementioned implication of audience in relation to onscreen 
violence exacerbates the position of the viewer here, indicating that we are both 
distanced from each Other and contrarily intimately involved with other subjects. As 
Levinas asserts, social accountability results in a paradox, whereby ‘the Face of the 
Other’ is ‘always…in some way, an incitement to murder’ or a call to reject our group 
commitment, and yet ‘the Face is also the “Thou Shalt not Kill”…it is the fact that I 
cannot let the other die alone’ (Levinas, 2006: 89). Our liability to each other - be we 
citizen or executioner - entails our confrontation with the Other to whom we commit. 
We cannot rid ourselves of responsibility for our conduct unto them as well as their 
actions unto us because of our obligation to the communal system by which we 
recognise the Other as constituent of that system (that is, we must have an Other to 
commit ourselves to in order that we may be social).         
Jamie Mayerfield refigures this paradox in concrete terms; ‘[w]e are social 
creatures. We come to expect and depend on the help of other people….But when 
other beings do not act to relieve our suffering, but are themselves the source of 
it…[they] become a tormenting presence’ (Mayerfield, 1999: 90). This is elucidated in 
Waldemar’s unanswered calls for help/mercy which are met only with Jacek’s 
prolonged violence. Piotr’s isolated cries to no-one (‘I abhor it’) are equally futile, and 
are rejoined only by the emptiness of the Law (or audience silence). It is crucial that 
the execution scene echoes the murder, as legal imperatives are also a source of 
suffering to which we are committed (albeit against our will). Society emphasises the 
good of the mass over that of the individual perpetrator, even if it is focused on the 
rights of a given individual victim. The Law behaves as if it is ‘mitigating our suffering’ 
(Mayerfield, 1999: 90) by negating the anguish of the penalised individual - ‘our’ 
vitally being a collective term which calls for concurrence. ‘Punishment’ then, ‘is 
always the action of a community towards its own criminals’ rather than ‘a limited 
form of individual violence’ (Temple, 1945: 3, my emphasis). Furthermore, as 
Livingston remarks ‘society owes protection to all its members’ in return for their 
complicity into and adherence to an unspoken civic contract (cited by Franklin in 
Madden et al. 1968: 120). 
As part of an argument which is significantly more complex than will come across 
in this brief summation, Vollmann makes the case that ‘a public slaying’ is ‘“better” - 
more honest, more subject to accountability - than a private one’ (Vollmann, 2005: 
358). Forsaking the irony that the execution is performed indoors, away from the 
public “for” whom it is performed, this principle relies on a ‘moral calculus’ that says 
the Law is “right” and the killer “wrong”, and justifies the motivations of the Law-
makers over those of the perpetrator. At the same time, it does not mean that the 
individual has to concur with the decision in personal, empathetic terms. This is lucidly 
manifested in Piotr’s reaction - he still wishes to have halted the killing, as he 
announces that he ‘was there…in that same park’ on the day of the murder. He 
detests the senseless death of Jacek, although he nevertheless maintains the position 
that the original slaughter was “wrong”. Conversely, it may be argued that the Law (in 
having a motive - and thus willed intent) is in some way more morally questionable 
than the apparently motiveless Jacek is - therefore the Law needs to execute in the 
“public” sphere to be visibly accountable for the killing, to share the burden of liability 
with the populous in whose name it extinguishes Jacek’s life (see Sorell, 1987: 60).  
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Despite the macro-universal scale, our view remains individually centred, in 
keeping with Kieslowski’s theme of isolation. While Waldemar is mildly antisocial, and 
Jacek projects his solipsism through fatalistic violence, it is Piotr who remains our 
social signifier, not only because he is the only one of the three central protagonists 
who survives the narrative, but also because of his municipal status. As Kieslowski 
declares,  
 
If you work in politics, or in any other public sphere, you’re publicly 
responsible…[y]ou’re always watched by others…But, at the same time…I have 
a very clear limit as to what I mustn’t do, and I try not to do it…And that has 
nothing to do with any description or exact definition of right or wrong. It has 
to do with concrete everyday decisions (Kieslowski, 1993: 149).  
 
Piotr embodies social accountability more markedly than any other figure in the 
narrative, as his public role (defence attorney) is one directly entangled with such 
issues. Piotr positions himself so as to share responsibility for the original murder in 
an attempt to denounce his actual role in the ‘giant machine’ that slaughters Jacek.   
Kieslowski uses Piotr as point of entry to allow the audience to access this position 
(of literal/legal responsibility for Jacek’s life), to symbolise our “public” implication in 
his execution. We are protected by the Law, and it is in our sharing of its moral edicts 
that we become partially liable for the Law’s duties towards us (as public). It is the 
pull between the rights of the mass (which the Law upholds) and his interaction with 
the individual (Jacek) that prove irreconcilable for Piotr. As Zizek asserts, ‘the 
distinction between our instinctive abhorrence of witnessing the torture or suffering of 
an individual with our own eyes, and our abstract knowledge of mass suffering’ is 
reliant on our ‘emotional-ethical responses’, which are ‘conditioned by age-old 
instinctual reactions of sympathy to suffering and pain witnessed directly’ (Zizek, 
2008: 36) - indeed, Zizek’s Marxist agenda further emphasises the mass/individual 
divide. In what follows, I will explore Piotr’s role in greater depth to outline the 
paradoxical split between isolated being and that same subject’s status as part of a 
mass/social-institution (governed by Law), and the specific problems it raises.    
 
 
Indivi-duality - Piotr’s Split Function:  
 
According to Levinas, in comparison to ‘the rights of man…guaranteed by the 
state’ - the ‘justice’ of which has ‘an immutable significance and stability’ -  ‘freedom 
in fraternity’ affirms ‘the responsibility of one-for-the-other’ and manifests ‘the rights 
of man…concretely to consciousness as the rights of the other, for which I am 
answerable’ (Levinas, 1993: 125). Social rights constitute the subject as mass and 
individual simultaneously, and this is Piotr’s problematic position. He embodies 
Dostoevsky’s adage that ‘[a]ll men are responsible for one another and I more than 
anyone else’ (Levinas, 2006: 92). In this case, Piotr is a defender of Jacek by 
occupation. Yet his declaration ‘I abhor it’ is evidently more universally focused - his 
reception of responsibility (onto his I) is the reversal of his outwardly vocal projection 
to the world (that is, he shouts to everyone, rather than no-one). It is on this macro-
scale that he envisages his accountability, however unrealistically that may be. By the 
film’s conclusion, he has overcompensated for the shift in perspective between 
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collective and personal. Instead of accepting that he cannot remain detached, or 
espouse universal criteria upon individual circumstances, he infers total blame upon 
himself. He does not accept Levinas’ proposal that ‘[t]here is a certain measure of 
violence necessary in terms of justice; but if one speak of justice, it is necessary to 
allow judges, it is necessary to allow institutions and the state’, instead opting that ‘if 
there were no order of justice, there would be no limit to my responsibility’ (Levinas, 
2006: 90).  
As I have argued in the previous section, in the case of legally sanctioned 
punishment, ‘violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their “evil” 
intentions, but is purely “objective”, systemic, anonymous’ (Zizek, 2008: 11). Piotr’s 
journey permits us to personalise the violence allayed both at the hands of the 
murderer (Jacek - for it is Piotr who names him for us), and the Law (manifested by 
Piotr himself). Ultimately, we learn more about Piotr than Jacek, and this is because of 
the narrative structure which individualises Piotr, just as the legal system isolates 
(names and blames) Jacek. The Law pertains to depersonalised morality in its 
performance, and the narrative seeks to undercut such a claim by demonstrating that 
moral choice is always subjective - perhaps this is what a focus on ‘violence which is 
enacted by social agents, evil individuals’ aims to ‘distract our attention from’ (Zizek, 
2008: 9). Our moral choices (as opposed to an illusion of moral inevitabilities) are not 
just political or even empirical, but are personalised - as is evinced by Piotr’s 
frustration. There is a disparity between ideal (the commandment, or the Law) and 
the reality of its opposition (violence and its affects) which is equally a divergence 
between distanced (how it should be) and actual (how it is, however unpredictable). 
These spaces are collapsed by the narrative - it is only in the conclusion where the 
objectivity of the Law breaks down into emotive response that we come to combine 
the theoretical/abstract with the personal. 
This reading of the cessation is made clear after the court hearing when we first 
learn Jacek’s name. Waldemar remains unnamed until Jacek’s execution, underscoring 
his anonymity, and evincing that the narrative is centred on killer rather than victim 
(as aforementioned, reaction to his death within the narrative is minimal). The act of 
naming itself is significant both for the audience to allocate meaning, and for the 
characters to engage inter-personally - thus Jacek confesses ‘when you called my 
name, tears came to my eyes’. Identification bridges the gap between alienation and 
social reception. As soon as Jacek is labelled, he becomes articulate (a primary 
indicator of social interaction). This is because he is both signalled as an individual 
through designation, and also because he has been tried and forced to recognise his 
civic duty to others via the Law. Conversely, Piotr’s moniker is revealed in the opening 
scene, and this has a profound effect on our perception. The punitive system is 
supposed to remain objective, faceless; as Sorell discerns, ‘principles must get their 
support not only from moral judgements, but from meeting [appropriate] standards of 
objectivity and impartiality’ (Sorell, 1987: 60). However, Piotr is the filter through 
which the processes of the Law occur, and are found wanting. For us, Waldemar is a 
plot device who commands no emotive aftermath. Jacek is too a vehicle, this time for 
Piotr’s journey; therefore foregrounding Piotr as the locus of our moral interest. If the 
Law is meant to emphasise the lost/transgressed rights of the victims of crime, and to 
restore balance in that sense, the film subverts this message by reversing the 
perspective onto the murderer, and personalising the pseudo-objective arbiter of 
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authority. The individuation of the Law allows us to critique supposedly shared moral 
judgements as individual subjective choices with no perpetual applicability.      
The presence of the Law asserts that there are distinct values of right and wrong 
that ought to be upheld. Conversely, it equally implies that we are likely to fail in our 
responsibility to one another, marking those judgements as unrealistic, and not in 
keeping with a given individual’s moral conceptions. In personalising the Law, and 
finding it wanting, the film questions punitive edicts are any more valid than those 
values enacted by the individual killer.  
 
 
Conclusion - Choice and Freedom: 
 
Kieslowski presents us with a murder paradigm which is fundamentally 
depersonalised from the outset - perhaps this is why it is easy to read the film as a 
didactic critique of contemporaneous Polish punitive legislation. Yet our moral choices 
(if not our moral contexts) are intimately personal. Ethical decisions have explicitly 
social repercussions, even if the film chooses not to make a feature of those until its 
conclusion. The depersonalisation of the characters and their motivations, in 
combination with prolonged violence seems irreconcilable, yet it allows the audience 
to emote into the situation through their horror. The emphases placed on observatory 
dissociation throughout implicitly critiques our emotional coldness towards each other 
in the modern urban environment, as well as the nature of subjectivity/motivation in 
opposition to the claims of impartiality (especially moral objectivity) that are 
embodied by the Law.  
From the outset, Decalogue 5 is framed as Piotr’s story - and the journey he 
undertakes (which the audience follows) is one from supposed extrication to the final 
annunciation of personal (‘I abhor it’). We begin the episode with Piotr’s voice which is 
ultimately detached from the narrative reality (over the opening credits). Even when 
we do see Piotr, he is isolated and framed by a gilt-edged mirror (connoting his 
aspiration to reserved objectivity) as he spouts aphorisms about the Law. By the 
conclusion of the narrative, he comes to realise that such a position is untenable. 
Notably, during his final protests, he is seated in car in a wooded area - perhaps the 
actual murder scene. His occupation of such a space underlines his ambivalent moral 
stance; he at once mimics Waldemar’s previous position - tied into the car, unable to 
escape the oncoming violence - and also Jacek’s after the murder.   
Despite Piotr’s protests about the suitability of the punishment, he remains 
‘against what [Jacek] did’. The choices an individual makes define the person, because 
judgement is fundamentally social. What remains unclear is if Piotr ‘abhors’ Jacek’s 
decision to murder, or his own to uphold the Law. Piotr’s frustration arises from the 
‘inevitable verdict’ and his inability to ‘correct mistakes’ in ‘the application of justice’. 
The Law seems to be infallible as Jacek’s inexorable capture (the procedures of arrest 
and trial) are not depicted here. We may deem that Jacek’s fate is already 
unavoidable, as we do not clearly see the progression leading to murder-motivation, 
just as we view preparations for the execution, but not the process that leads us 
there. Consequently, the choices undertaken appear to be arbitrary, inasmuch as the 
character’s destinies seem to be inescapable; no changes to Piotr’s closing speech or 
Jacek’s journey in the taxi would make any difference. Part of Piotr’s helplessness of 
course, is that destiny appears inalterable, just as legal decrees ultimately intimate 
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the difference between right and wrong to be indisputable. It is vital that Jacek does 
not impede himself from murdering, even when “the witness” signals that he should 
halt, or in the pause before he finishes Waldemar. Jacek is bound to his fate, yet we 
should note that he binds his own hands.  
Jacek’s hesitation indicates that he could have stopped the murder itself. Our 
options are limited to a given scope, but we do have choices within those confines. 
Hence, when Jacek asks for a ‘cup of tea’ in the café, he is told there is none - he 
instead is limited to ‘coffee and cake’, so this is exactly what he orders. However, he 
can choose the type of cake, and does so impetuously. This eagerness to select within 
a given scope is what is missing from his larger scale decisions. As he binds his hands, 
Kieslowski cuts to a sequence in which dogs strain against their leads. This 
juxtaposition of micro-scale, everyday events stresses the pervasiveness of 
choice/freedom and restraint/oppression throughout our daily lives, which find 
figurative resonances in moral questions raised by the narrative. Jacek pushes against 
the moral limitations of his societal environment, and makes the decision to negate 
them, just as Waldemar arbitrarily provokes the dogs. As Kieslowski proposes ‘we are 
in a position to set our own inner compass. But often, even when we know what is 
honest and the right thing to do, we can’t choose it. I believe we are not free’ 
(Kieslowski, 1993: 150). That is not to suggest that all our actions are pre-
determined, ensuring that ‘people cannot intelligibly be blamed or punished for what 
they do’ due a lack of will (Sorrel, 1987: 148). When Piotr declares ‘people are free’ in 
the opening sequence, we should not be surprised that he contradicts Kieslowski’s 
stance, as his journey ends in concurrence with the director. Finally, as Kant avows, 
‘because to comply with laws is to comply with laws they each make’ through their 
participation in “society”, citizens ‘are free or autonomous’. Yet it is simultaneously 
through such a system of personal responsibility for others that ‘they are constrained’ 
(Sorell, 1987: 69). 
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